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Competition and Regulation
in the UK Electricity Market
Stephen Littlechild ∗
Introduction
This paper describes the development of UK electricity policy in the context of the
development of energy policy in the European Union. It notes the principles for
promoting competition that have emerged from experience. It describes the mea-
sures taken to transform the nationalised electricity industry to a fully competitive
one, in both generation and retail supply. It outlines policy and developments on
wholesale trading: the Pool and NETA. Finally it indicates some of the costs and
benefits to customers and notes the increase in regulation over time.
1. EU proposals & policy
The UK Government embarked on the liberalisation of the electricity supply in-
dustry in 1989. At the time the EU was in the process of creating a single market in
goods and services, although the European Commission recognised that it would
take some years before similar arrangements would apply to energy markets. In
the early 1990s the EU had the opportunity to observe the “British experiment”
taking place in the liberalisation of the electricity supply industry. During the later
1990s the EU put in place legislation that introduced aspects of liberalisation to
the European market. However, the legislation was confined largely to access to
and use of electricity transmission networks within and between Member States.
In 2001 the EC proposed a Directive that, if adopted, would have introduced
full market opening for electricity in Member States by 2005, so that all con-
sumers would be free to choose their own supplier by that date. Users would have
∗. Honorary Professor, University of Birmingham Business School. Principal Research Fellow,
Judge Institute of Management, University of Cambridge. Formerly Director General of Electricity
Supply 1989-1998. Workshop on Opening of Electricity Markets, Marseilles, January 23rd 2004. I am
grateful to John Stewart for assistance in preparing this paper. littlechild@tanworth.mercianet.co.uk
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access to transmission networks, and operators of networks would be required to
provide greater transparency. The EC argued that “Third party access based on
published and non-discriminatory tariffs, and a high level of unbundling, are not
only conducive but necessary to ensure effective competition.”
The governments of most Member States agreed to these proposals. The French
government vetoed them because of its opposition to retail competition.
During the following year 2002 Member States agreed a revised policy on a
slightly extended timescale. Competition in electricity supply would be introduced
to the non-residential market by 2004 and to the residential market in 2007. EU
energy policy is now broadly in line with UK policy, but both sets of arrangements
continue to develop. For example, the EU is now focused on improving access
arrangements for use of transmission networks and interconnectors.
2. 2nd EU benchmarking report
In its second report on the progress towards a single market in electricity the
EC notes that policy has moved forward but highlights several areas of difficulty.
In the main these difficulties are considered transitional but the EC still needs
to monitor closely the rates of implementation by each Member State. The EC
identified four areas:
First the existence of differential rates of market opening between Member States
reduces the extent to which benefits of competition are available to house-
holds in some Member States. The different rates of opening also distort
competition by allowing companies in some Member States to benefit from
cross-subsidies during the restructuring of their industries.
Second disparities in tariffs for access to transmission networks, reflecting a general
lack of transparency and inefficient regulation of companies, create barriers
to competition.
Third high market power in generation and illiquid wholesale markets impede new
entrants.
Fourth insufficient interconnection between transmission networks and unsatisfac-
tory methods for allocating scarce capacity on interconnectors create con-
straints on trade between the electricity markets in Member States.
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3. Creating effective competition:
the lessons
In the light of these developments in EU policy, and the concerns about the
effectiveness of competition in generation and retail supply, it may be helpful to
examine how the UK dealt with these issues.
In the light of UK experience, five principles seem to be fundamental to secur-
ing effective competition.
First effective competition needs more than simply removing the statutory barri-
ers to entry.
Second there need to be enough sellers at the outset, to ensure that prices are com-
petitive and to provide buyers with a choice of sellers. (No doubt it is also
necessary to have enough buyers to provide sellers with adequate choice,
but that was never an issue in the UK at the time, with twelve major supply
businesses and a significant number of large users able to buy direct.)
Third there needs to be adequate separation and unbundling of business activi-
ties, distinguishing especially between monopoly and competitive sectors.
Putting the transmission network into separate ownership was particularly
important.
Fourth different activities within a company - such as generation, retail supply,
and distribution - need to be run as separate businesses, with separate ac-
counts. Later, this needed to be reinforced by requirements of separate staff,
premises, IT facilities, and separate legal ownership.
Fifth operators of transmission and distribution networks need to publish charges
for access. These charges must be non-discriminatory, transparent and sub-
ject to regulatory review.
4. Competition in electricity generation
Before privatisation, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) owned
and operated the transmission network and most electricity generators in England
and Wales. Under the privatisation programme the CEGB was split into a separate
transmission company with duty to facilitate competition and three successor
generator companies, one of which comprised the commercial nuclear generation
stations. The objective was to encourage new entry into the generation sector and
économiepublique
5
dossier Stephen Littlechild
promote competition 1.
Within a few years it became apparent that three generating companies were
not enough to secure effective competition. There were repeated price increases by
generators in the Pool, which triggered complaints from large users and regional
supply companies. They argued that Pool Prices were higher than they would
have been if the market were fully competitive. Although new entrants came into
the market, on a larger scale than anticipated, this took several years, and was
insufficient to prevent the early price increases and to provide sufficient choice to
users and suppliers.
5. Regulatory action
The Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) investigated the complaints of
price increases and other allegations of uncompetitive activities by the successor
generators. It concluded that the two fossil fuel generators (National Power and
PowerGen) were able to exert undue influence on Pool Prices. The preferred rem-
edy was to bring about more competition rather than introduce price controls on
generators. However, OFFER had no powers to compel the successor companies
to divest generation capacity, although it could refer the companies to the Com-
petition Commission which did have that power if it concluded that the situation
was against the public interest.
OFFER therefore indicated that it would make a reference to the Competition
Commission unless the two successor generating companies agreed to the vol-
untary divestment of 6GW of their generation capacity (4 GW from the larger
company, 2 GW from the smaller one). This was equivalent to about 8 per cent
of the capacity in the market. Until these disposals were accomplished, the com-
panies agreed to a two year transitional arrangement on bidding into the Pool to
keep average Pool Prices below the level then obtaining.
6. Further developments
The divestment introduced a more competitive market with more choice, but
the market was by no means fully competitive. It seemed as though further reg-
ulatory action would be required. Within two years of the first disposals, some
1. In Scotland, two vertically integrated companies each combined all the business activities of
generation, transmission and supply. Each was restructured into separate businesses although priva-
tised in the same ownership.
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generating companies wished to acquire retail supply and distribution activities.
OFFER opposed these acquisitions on the grounds that there was still not enough
competition in either generation or supply, and such mergers could make the situ-
ation worse. However, if the companies were to make further voluntary disposals,
this time comprising two tranches of 4 GW each, this would bring compensation
benefits that would allow the mergers to proceed.
Over time, the incumbent generators began to find it profitable to sell more
generation capacity to new entrants on a voluntary basis. This brought about a
significantly more competitive market.
7. The present situation
in the generation market
As a result of much new entry and the restructuring of existing plant, the
present market is much more competitive than before. At the time of privatisation
there were three main generators, with about five very small generators including
the interconnectors with France and Scotland and the Pumped Storage Business
owned by National Grid Company. In contrast there are now some 40 generation
companies operating in the market. The market share of the largest generating
company was 48 per cent in 1990 and is under 17 per cent now. Over the same
period the combined market shares of the largest two companies has fallen from
78 per cent to about 29 per cent, and the share of the largest three companies
from about 94 per cent to 38 per cent 2.
From 1997 to 2001 wholesale prices fell by about 40 per cent in real terms,
although they have subsequently recovered some of this ground. There is obvi-
ously much speculation about the main reasons for this. The main driver seems
to have been the less concentrated market structure, with the introduction of the
New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) a contributing factor, along with
lower fuel prices and greater efficiency of generating stations.
8. Wholesale trading - Part 1: The Pool
From privatisation to 2001 the wholesale market in England and Wales was an
Electricity Pool. A uniform price was set for all buyers and sellers on the basis of
bids by sellers. This arrangement had the advantages of providing all parties with
2. I am grateful to Nigel Cornwall for these figures from 2003.
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a published price and an open market. Over time, OFFER introduced incentives on
National Grid Company as system operator to reduce the once-high uplift costs.
However, the Pool had several disadvantages, which over time compromised
the effectiveness of its arrangements. A uniform system of marginal prices facil-
itated the exercise of market power. Only the supply side participated actively in
setting prices, not the demand side, making it ‘only half a market’. The uniform
price limited the scope for competition in retail activities. Most parties consid-
ered that the governance arrangements were too inflexible and unable to respond
effectively to changes in the market. The compulsory pool restricted the ability
of parties to innovate, and a lack of transparency in price setting hindered the
development of markets in derivative products including futures markets.
As part of the policy to promote further competition, OFFER took steps to
replace the Pool by more competitive and flexible arrangements.
9. Wholesale trading - Part 2: NETA
In 2001 New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) replaced the Pool There
is now bilateral trading between demand and supply side participants, and this
accounts for over 95 per cent of electricity output. Market participants are now
responsible for balancing their own position, and exposed to penalties for in-
balances in each settlement period. The Network Operator takes bids and offers
from generators and suppliers to balance the system.
The system rewards flexibility and predictability. This is accentuated by the
dual cash-out system, whereby the price paid for buying extra energy in the
Balancing Mechanism is typically higher than the price received for selling extra
energy. This new approach has exposed the higher costs of generation that is less
flexible and predictable, notably from some renewable sources.
Additional efficiency incentives on the National Grid Company have further
reduced the costs of balancing of the system.
10. Retail electricity supply
UK government policy was to open the retail supply market in three phases.
Customers with a maximum demand greater than 1MW a year would be free to
choose their electricity supplier from 1990. In 1994 market opening would be
extended to customers with a maximum demand of 100kW, and in 1998 to all
customers.
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From the outset the transmission and distribution network operators were re-
quired to set public access charges to suppliers for use of the networks. These
were limited by the price controls on these networks. This facilitated competition
by rival suppliers.
For the large users with access to the competitive market, price controls on
final prices were soon removed. Supplies to franchise customers (those without
access to competition) were subject to overall price controls.
In 1994, when the market for medium-sized customers was opened to compe-
tition, the controls on their final prices were removed, as with the larger users. In
both cases these customers were adequately protected by competition, which led
to lower prices in the market.
Nowadays, most large customers sign supply contracts for about one year,
and consequently some switch their supplier as frequently as every year. Initially,
some customers experienced problems due to inaccurate meter reading and data
transfer between meter readers and suppliers.
In light of the experience gained in the two opening phases of competition,
OFFER and market participants made extensive preparations for the opening of
the residential market. Unlike the first two phases customers in the residential
sector were not required to install half hourly meters, so a system of electricity
profiling was developed for settlement purposes. Suppliers needed to develop
their IT and billing systems to cope with the new arrangements, which proved
to be major procurement and development projects. Meter reading arrangements
needed to be specified, and provision was made for competition in meter reading
separate from competition in supply.
To ensure that standards of service did not decline with competition, codes
of service were specified for all suppliers. In addition, to avoid price increases
before competition became effective, OFFER introduced transitional two year(s)
fixed price caps on incumbent suppliers. Unlike the previous price controls, these
did not allow actual purchasing costs to be passed-through to customers, hence
provided greater incentive to purchase efficiently.
From 1990, incumbent suppliers were in the same ownership as distribution
companies. Although they were required to separate supply and distribution ac-
tivities, other competitors (new entrants into retail supply) were concerned that
separation was not adequate to allow a fully competitive market. The new Utilities
Act provided for greater separation of distribution and supply activities, and in
particular required these to be legally separate businesses, and also provided for
separate licences for distribution and supply. This enabled companies to sell one
activity and specialise in the other if they wished to do so. Several in fact did,
although subsequent mergers have to some extent re-established vertical integra-
tion.
économiepublique
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11. Retail competition: residential
Before the residential market opened it was unclear whether competition would
be attractive to either customers or suppliers. In fact residential customers wel-
comed the opportunity to choose their suppliers. The rate of switching was re-
markably constant, at a net rate of movement away from incumbents of about 1
per cent a month. As of now, some 46 per cent of customers are with a supplier
other than their incumbent, and over 50 per cent have switched suppliers at one
time or another.
Price reductions were initially in the region of 10 per cent, but later increased
to 20 per cent. OFGEM (successor regulator to OFFER) extended the transitional
price caps on final supplies for a further two years. The strength and extent of
competition enabled OFGEM to abolish them in 2000.
Some customers complained about selling tactics, or experienced problems
arising from the processes of switching and erroneous transfers by suppliers. Cus-
tomer reputation and regulatory action, and in some cases heavy financial penal-
ties for offending suppliers, have helped to induce improvements by companies.
12. Price Performance
in England and Wales
During the period from 1990 to 1998 all customers experienced real price re-
ductions of 25 to 35 percent. A major part of this can be attributed to competition
in generation and retail supply. Other factors that have contributed are lower fuel
prices, tighter network price controls and the abolition of the nuclear levy.
Over the next few years large customers realised a further 27 per cent reduc-
tion, but which for most is offset by a 10 per cent increase due to the Climate
Change Levy giving a net reduction of 17 per cent. Suppliers have continued to
offer price reductions to domestic customers in the region of 17 per cent when
comparing those of an incumbent supplier in 1998 with cheapest competitor now.
In both cases there have been price increases in recent months reflecting higher
prices in the wholesale market.
13. Net benefits of privatisation
Is it possible to quantify the costs and benefits of electricity privatisation? In
1997 Professor David Newbery and Michael Pollitt carried out such a cost benefit
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analysis of privatising the CEGB generation and transmission sector of the indus-
try. They estimated the efficiency benefits in terms of running existing stations at
lower costs, the one-off restructuring costs (principally early severance payments
to employees), and the investment savings from building more economic gas-fired
plant rather than more costly coal and nuclear plant that had been the previous
policy of the industry.
The results depended on which of two counterfactuals were assumed: whether
one assumed that the nationalised industry would have become more efficient and
changed its investment policy, or not. The following table shows their estimates
of these magnitudes.
Table 1 : A previous calculation of the costs and benefits of privatisation
Counterfactual pro-CEGB pro-privatisation
Efficiency benefits 7.6 8.8
Restructuring costs -2.8 -2.8
Fuel/investment savings -0.7 3.6
NPV of benefits 4.1 9.6
Environmental externalities 1.9 2.3
NPV incl externalities 6.0 11.9
(£ billions Net Present Value at 6 per cent discount rate)
Efficiency savings are estimated at about £8 billion present value in either
counterfactual, restructuring costs were nearly £3 billion, and investment savings
ranged from under £1 billion to well over £3 billion depending on the counter-
factual. The net benefit is between £4 and £10 billions. Environmental benefits
from cleaner fuels might be worth another £2 billion or so. These calculations
suggest that privatisation was worthwhile, in the sense of increasing aggregate
net present value of benefits to all participants in the economy.
14. Recalculation of benefits
Further research by Geoffrey Horton and Littlechild, which is still in progress,
reassesses the Newberry and Pollitt study and updates it to reflect experience since
1987. They suggest that the efficiency gains are likely to be greater than estimated
in the earlier work, and for the moment base this on sensitivity analyses in the
previous paper. They also argue that the CEGB would have built more nuclear
and coal stations than assumed in the Newbery and Pollitt counterfactual, and
this would have been more costly than gas-fired stations. Savings from emissions
might be greater if there are higher CO2 values with the advent of traded markets.
économiepublique
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The table below is a preliminary indication of the possible results of the Horton
& Littlechild recalculation. It suggests that the net benefits of privatisation might
be of the order of twice the level previously calculated. A range of figures is given
for environmental benefits since the possible market price of those is particularly
uncertain at present.
Table 2 : Revised benefits of privatisation
Pro-CEGB Pro-privatisation Horton and Littlechild
Efficiency benefits 7.6 8.8 12.4
Restructuring costs -2.8 -2.8 -2.8
Fuel/investment savings -0.7 3.6 13.3
NPV of benefits 4.1 9.6 22.9
Environmental externalities 1.9 2.3 2.5 - 5.2
NPV plus externalities 6.0 11.9 25.4 - 28.1
(£ billions Net Present Value at 6 per cent discount rate)
15. Who gets the benefits of privatisation?
Newberry and Pollitt calculated that more than all the benefits went to in-
vestors, and that consumers were worse off. However, this result depends on what
would have happened in the counterfactual alternative, and also reflects the early
date of the study.
Horton and Littlechild use different counterfactual assumptions and argue, for
example, that the nationalised industry would have raised its prices more than
assumed. They also have access to more recent data than Newberry and Pollit,
which is characterised by lower costs but also by lower prices to customers. On
the basis of these assumptions, the research points to customers gaining as well.
Studies carried out by Ofgem and the National Audit Office are consistent with
these preliminary conclusions.
16. Increase in UK regulation
Active regulation of the electricity supply industry has been costly. Initially
OFFER plus OFGAS cost about £16m a year to operate. In 2000/01 Ofgem, the
successor to these two bodies, cost £87m, a five fold increase.
OFGEM says that the main reasons for this increase are transitional and can
be attributed to several key projects, notably reform of the Pool and the creation
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of NETA, the creation of Ofgem from OFFER/OFGAS, and the creation of a new
consumer organisation “energywatch”.
Removing the costs of these items leaves an underlying cost of running Ofgem
of £30m a year during the period from 1998/9 to 2001/2. This is equivalent to
0.25 per cent of an annual residential bill and represents good value for money,
especially when the results of the cost benefit analyses are taken into account.
Even with this cost, regulation is preferable to either government controlling the
industry or no regulation (which can amount to the same thing). Problems have
arisen in countries where such methods apply, for example in Germany and New
Zealand.
17. Conclusion
EU policy is moving towards UK policy, but some EU countries still have some
way to go to catch up with the more advanced Member States. Competition and
efficiency incentives brought lower prices, better quality and innovation in the
UK. This process required the active regulation of incumbents to ensure access to
networks, to stimulate increased efficiency therein, and to promote competition
in generation and retail supply. Without this active regulation the full benefits of
market competition would not have been achieved.
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